This paper presents evidence from Rwanda's Girinka (`One Cow per Poor Family') program that has distributed more than 130,000 livestock asset transfers in the form of cows to the rural poor since 2006. Supply side constraints on the program resulted in some beneciaries receiving complementary training with the cow transfer, and other households not receiving such training with their cow. We exploit these constraints to estimate the additional impact of receiving complementary training with the cow transfer, on household's economic outcomes up to six years after having received the livestock asset transfer. Our results show that even in a setting such as rural Rwanda where linkages between farmers and produce markets remain weak, the provision of training with asset transfers has permanent and economically signicant impacts on milk production, milk yields from livestock, household earnings, and asset accumulation. The results have important implications for the current generation of`ultrapoor' livestock asset transfer programs being trialled globally as a means to allow the rural poor to better their economic lives.
I.
Introduction
Many of the world's antipoverty programs aim to either relax credit constraints for poor households, or to relax constraints related to their ability to acquire human capital and skills. For example, the spread of rural banking, provision of micronance and asset transfer programs all represent eorts to ease capital constraints. Vocational training or cash transfers conditioned on school attendance spearhead policies attempting to tackle skill constraints. The fact that the world's poor lack both capital and skills is now well established [Duo and Banerjee 2007] .
The most recent wave of policy approaches have been embodied in various`ultrapoor' poverty programs that provide assets to households in the form of livestock, combined with intense training on how to utilize those assets for production. The results from Randomized Control Trial (RCT) evaluations of these interventions are promising: Bandiera et al. [2013] document how one such program operated by BRAC in rural Bangladesh led, after four years, to a 36% increase in beneciary earnings, and an 8% increase in consumption per adult equivalent. Banerjee et al. [2012] evaluate a comparable bundled program of livestock asset transfers and training in West Bengal and nd consumption increases of 15% relative to baseline. Finally, Morduch et al. [2012] evaluate a similar program in Utter Pradesh, India, but nd more muted impacts, perhaps because of the co-existence of a generous wage employment program operating in Utter Pradesh at the same time.
These types of livestock asset transfer and training programs are now being piloted in ten countries around the world, and policy makers are paying great attention to the ability of such interventions to successfully reach the very poorest of the world's poor. As such, combined programs of livestock asset transfers and intense training are viewed as a promising way to transform the economic lives of typically landless, assetless agricultural laborers, into the economic lives more closely resembling households engaged in basic entrepreneurial activities focused around livestock rearing and the sales of livestock produce. 1 1 To get a sense of the scale and prominence of these types of asset transfer program, we note that as of 2011, BRAC's program in Bangladesh was already reaching close to 400,000 women and a further 250,000 will be reached between 2012 and 2016. Another variant of the program in which the asset transfer is purchased using a loan had reached 600,000 beneciaries in 2011 and will reach a further 150,000 by 2016 [BRAC 2011] . As of November 2011, ten dierent pilots were active around the world, http://graduation.cgap.org/pilots/. BRAC is piloting the program in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other pilots are being carried out in by other organizations in Andhra Pradesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Pakistan, Peru and Yemen. Common to all these interventions is the simultaneous bundling of asset transfers and complementary training. However, given that both components are very costly to provide, at least relative to most other piloted policy interventions aiming to relax capital or skills constraints, it is important to establish the relative rates of return to each component. Doing so will allow academics and policy makers to better understand whether and when the two should be bundled. The evidence we provide represents a novel rst step in this direction. More broadly, our analysis sheds light on the rates of return to improving the skills of farmers related to animal husbandry, that remains a highly relevant policy intervention for many developing countries.
Livestock asset transfers are necessarily expensive because animals are indivisible: even supplying one cow or bualo to a household can increase its baseline wealth ten-fold, especially if the very poorest households, that are typically landless and assetless at baseline, are targeted [Bandiera et al. 2013] . Training is expensive because as targeted households tend never to have previously owned livestock, they lack the human capital to utilize livestock. Training then is necessarily intense because beneciary households need to be taught how to look after animals across the harvesting cycle, and the birth-milk production cycle of large livestock can last up to 18 months.
In many cases there are reasonable grounds on which to assume the provision of assets and training to be complementary to each other and so both should necessarily be provided. However, as such programs are being rapidly rolled out around the world, they inevitably will begin to target dierent populations of households, and will also begin to operate in economic environments that vary in the ability of local markets to be able to provide training. As such, it then inevitably becomes a more open question as to whether the provision of both components of asset transfers and training are equally cost eective and should both necessarily be provided by intervening agencies.
In this paper we provide some novel evidence on the additional impact of receiving complementary training with livestock transfers, by evaluating Rwanda's Girinka ('One Cow per Poor Family') program that distributed livestock asset transfers in the form of one cow to each beneciary household. Beneciary households were identied by their communities to be among the poorest in the locality. The program has been jointly implemented by government agencies as well as a number of NGOs. On the government side, the main implementing agency was the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), while the largest of the NGOs involved were Heifer International and Send a Cow. Supply side constraints on government and NGO capabilities resulted in some beneciaries receiving training with the cow transfer, and other households not receiving such training, but only the cow transfer.
We exploit these supply side constraints to estimate the impact of receiving training with the livestock transfer on household's medium term likelihood to produce milk, to trade milk, and the impacts on household's earnings and asset accumulation.
While ours is not a randomized control trial, we are able to oer among the rst tentative evidence on the marginal impact of complementary training in addition to livestock asset transfers. This is key for the future design and expansion of such ultra-poor style asset transfer programs. Moreover, in contrast to current evaluations of ultra-poor programs, we document these impacts over the longer term, up to six years after the receipt of the Girinka cow for some households. Relative to some of the ultra-poor evaluations described above [Banerjee et al. 2012 , Murdoch et al. 2012 and Bandiera et al. 2013] we also provide more detailed evidence on the mechanisms through which such programs likely generate earnings gains to households, such as the propensity to produce milk, and milk yields per animal.
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To evaluate the Girinka program and measure the impacts of farmers having received training with the asset transfers relative to those that only received the asset, in 2012 we surveyed 885 beneciaries of the Girinka program. They had received their cows since 2006, with the median household having received the cow in 2009. We are thus able to assess the longer term impacts of the original provision of training bundled with the livestock asset, and again this time span is longer than that covered by the current rst generation of RCT evaluations of ultra-poor style livestock transfer programs. In addition to the main data collected from this sample of Girinka beneciaries, we also conducted a survey of government sector vets that served our sample population and we conducted unstructured interviews with a number of stakeholders most importantly with Girinka NGO partners who were responsible for the distribution of some of the cows. This provides further insights into the actual operations 2 As our analysis is based on a sample of Girinka beneciaries, our estimates measure the impact of training provision in addition to an asset transfer. We do not measure the impact of the asset transfer relative to not receiving anything. Hence our results have no implications for whether households should be taking up such programs in the rst place. Such an analysis is conducted by Pimkina et al. 2013 for the cows distributed by Heifer International as part of the Girinka program, comparing recipients to either future beneciaries or non-beneciaries. Among a sample of around 4,000 households, they nd substantial impacts of cow transfers on dairy and meat consumption, as well as improvements in child anthropometrics. This line of research is worth pursuing in future research given the recent work of Anagol et al. [2012] documenting how the ownership of livestock generate relatively low (or even negative) returns for households in rural India. of the Girinka program and especially the existence and nature of supply constraints that we exploit to measure the impact of training over and above livestock transfers.
Our main results are as follows. First, households that received training with their cow are 56% more likely to be producing milk in 2012, and on average produce 1.5 liters more milk per day. This corresponds to a 162% increase in milk production over households that received no training. This increased production stems largely from increased milk yields obtained holding constant the stock of cows, rather than increased holdings of cows per se. Second, households that received training are 16% more likely to consume home produced milk and almost 8% more likely to sell or give milk away to neighbors or friends. Nevertheless, we do not nd any signicant impact on the quantities consumed or given away.
Third, the increased production and sales of milk translate into signicantly higher households earnings: households with training experience a sixfold increase in earnings from milk sales as compared to the average earnings of households that did not receive training. Moreover, the other key income gain for trained households comes through sales of animals. These income gains dwarf the monetary cost of the training supplied per farmer, generating rates of return far in excess of those that are likely to be available through other investments. Finally, the increased earnings households with training experience, translate into greater asset accumulation: households that received training with their transferred cow since 2006, are signicantly more likely to own cooking stoves, bicycles and mattresses by the time of the survey in 2012.
Overall, the results show that even in a setting where linkages between farmers and markets remain weak so that the returns to training might be somewhat attenuated, the provision of training with asset transfers still has permanent and economically signicant impacts on household's ability to produce milk, livestock productivity, earnings, and asset accumulation. In short, farmer skills related to animal husbandry matter: attempts to improve these types of human capital are likely to yield high returns, reducing income volatility as households are more able to rely on stable income streams from the sales of livestock produce such as milk. These type of human capital investments, for those that have long exited the formal schooling system, are an important form of antipoverty measure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the One Cow program.
Section III describes our data and empirical method. Section IV presents the core ndings, and Section V concludes.
II.
The Girinka`One Cow' Program
In 2011 Rwanda had a GDP per capita of just under $600, placing it in the bottom decile of the world cross-country income distribution. However, longer term trends in income growth are promising: over the last decade Rwanda has witnessed strong growth driven primarily by the services and agriculture sectors, with real GDP per capita increasing at over 5% per annum, and poverty falling by 12pp in the past ve years alone [National Institute of Statistics Rwanda 2012] . However, despite this recent success, exports remain concentrated in traditional strengths of tea, coee and minerals; at least 70% of the population still rely on agriculture for their livelihoods; and more than 40% of the population live below the national poverty line that is at slightly less than $190 per annum, or 52c per day. The aim of the program is to increase productivity in the livestock and agriculture sectors, and hence drive improvements in household incomes and reduction in poverty among the rural poor. The program always intended to target the poorest households subject to them having sucient resources to care for any transferred animal. Formal eligibility criteria were in place from 2009 onwards and these selection criteria were that the household did not already own a cow; had ownership of at least 0.3ha of land but not more than 0.75ha of land; had planted sucient feed area (approximately 0.2ha) and had the ability to build a shed for the cow. Communities themselves were asked to identify which households met these criteria. Interviews with several district and sector vets conducted as part of this study revealed that communities typically were able to select beneciaries subject to them meeting these criteria. The involvement of the community in determining beneciaries is akin to participatory wealth rankings that are becoming a more commonplace method by which to identify the rural poor. In a randomized evaluation of dierent targeting methods, Alatas et al. [2011] show that, compared to proxy means tests, community appraisal methods resulted in higher satisfaction and greater legitimacy. Their distinctive characteristic was that community methods put a larger weight on earnings potential.
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The program also aimed to genetically strengthen the population of cows by introducing higher productivity cow varieties to Rwanda. The 'exotic' cow breeds distributed have included Friesian/Holstein and Jersey varieties, as these breeds produce far more milk than the indigenous species. Crossbreeds between these varieties and the local breed were expected to perform particularly well, given their higher resistance to heat and local parasites.
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Crucially for our evaluation, we exploit the fact that dierent distributors of cows oered varying levels of training, support and extension services to recipients of cows.
Some distributors provided cows with no complementary training whatsoever. Some distributors hired their own veterinarians/trainers to extend services to their new beneciaries. Some distributors also gave some form of support package along with the cow, including for example medicines, or the materials for building a shed to house the animal.
Interviews with NGOs in the sector revealed that some viewed training as an integral part of the package. For example Send a Cow, one of the largest NGO partners in the program, explained their Girinka operation as being a ve year process, beginning with training in preparation for receiving the cow (e.g. producing feed, 3 Two other points are of note. First, our eld interviews with district and sector vets suggested that it is typically the poorest who receive cows rst, and that while the eligibility criteria have not always been strictly followed, they typically erred on the side of providing cows to the very poorest.
Second, prior to 2009 there were concerns raised that the poorest were not being well targeted by the Girinka program. There followed an investigation into the program, ordered by President Paul Kagame. As a result, the government undertook a large scale operation where more than 20,000 cows were conscated and redistributed, although it was later determined that some who had had their cows conscated were actually poor too (despite being local leaders) and so their names were added to the lists to receive cows again in the future.
4 All cows were supposed to be distributed in-calf, so that the household would have a new calf and milk production within a short space of time. However, estimates from our data suggest that in reality, less than one third were actually distributed in-calf. In order for the program to be selfperpetuating, beneciaries were obliged to pass on the gift by giving the rst born calf to a new beneciary household in the area (the so called pass-on or kwitura in Kinyarwanda). Where the rstborn calf is a bull, it is expected to be sold to purchase a heifer to pass on. As the price for heifers is typically higher, the purchased heifer would usually be younger than the bull sold and not yet old enough to breed. building a shed) and ending with the households graduating out of poverty because they had acquired the skills to care and manage cows as a productive asset. We obtained information on training costs from one of the most important NGO partners for the delivery of the Girinka program, Send a Cow. Their training related to animal husbandry, that takes place over seven days and to groups of farmers, was estimated to cost around RWF 7800 per beneciary. It is this cost gure that we will later be able to compare any monetary returns generated by the training to.
Nevertheless, not all stakeholders provided training to the beneciaries. While some were unable to provide training with cows due to supply constraints, other NGOs also chose not to provide additional support with cow transfers for one of two reasons. First, some NGOs argued that as animal husbandry has been deeply rooted in the Rwandan culture, a body of local knowledge existed among farmers that can be passed on through social learning. While this might well be the case for traditional breeds, it would not apply to the same extent as some of the exotic breed of cow distributed through the Girinka program. In addition, an established body of evidence suggests such processes of learning can be slow, inecient and limited by other social norms [Foster and Rosenzweig 2010] . Second, some NGO providers perceived government veterinarians to be easily accessible to farmers in case of need, and so training to already be eectively on hand to beneciary households. However, as the data described below shows, travel times to the nearest sector vets are typically quite high, so households face high xed costs, or waiting costs, in order to be able to access such services. Moreover, these vets are often overburdened by having to serve a large number of farmers over a geographically dispersed area.
In this paper, our primary focus is to use the documented variation in training provision caused by NGO behavior to try to quantify the eect of providing training alongside with the cow on household's medium term likelihood to produce milk, to trade milk, and on household's earnings and asset accumulation. However, we also discuss the evidence comparing the returns to training provided simultaneously with cow transfers, to training (potentially) endogenously sought out by households from sector vets at some date after the cow transfer.
III.

Data, Descriptives and Empirical Method
A. Sampling
We use two data sources in our study: primary data collected from a sample of 6 The cell in the North was dropped due to delays in getting survey teams to the eld. This was down to logistical delays, and was unrelated to the geography or location of the cell dropped. There were a few other minor adjustments to the sample. One cell in Buruhukiro sector (Nyamagabe district, Southern Province) was too small for the desired sample, so it was combined with the next smallest cell in the sector. Kagarama sector in Kicukiro was replaced by Gahanga sector, as Kagarama was too wealthy and there were not enough recipients to sample from.
survey weights are used throughout.
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For interviews with government sector veterinarians, the sampling procedure was straightforward: each cell in Rwanda hosts one ocial veterinarian so that we were able to approach and interview all 30 government veterinarians that cover the 30 cells in our study sample.
B. Survey Instruments
Girinka beneciaries were administered a household questionnaire that included standard modules on household demographics, income, expenditure, as well as an asset module which asked about both current asset ownership and the ownership of assets at the time of receiving the Girinka cow. In addition, the questionnaire included detailed modules on milk production, milk sales (quantities and prices) as well as milk gifts and own consumption of milk.
8 Around six months after the household survey was elded, we surveyed sector vets by telephone. The survey was conducted with all vets present in areas where beneciaries interviewed reside, implying 30 interviews (one per sector). The main purpose was to collect additional information on questions that arose during the analysis of information provided by beneciaries. We additionally conducted unstructured interviews with a number of stakeholders most importantly with Girinka NGO partners who were responsible for the distribution of cows, and some of which were able to provide training bundled with the cow.
7 To deal with imperfections in the sampling frame in eld, the following rules were followed: (i) all 16 selected beneciaries should be exhausted before using replacements; (ii) where a cow had been taken away pre-2009 and redistributed within the same cell, the enumerator followed the cow to the new recipient; (iii) if an original beneciary had moved within the same cell (e.g. between villages), they were tracked to their new village; (iv) where the cow or individual could not be traced (usually because they had moved to a dierent cell), a replacement was to be used; (v) where replacements were exhausted, the sector vet was asked to provide a replacement in the form of the household closest to the one originally sampled.
8 The questionnaire included an informed consent page, which explained to beneciaries that their participation was voluntary and reassured them that they would not be personally identiable.
Enumerators requested that beneciaries provide verbal conrmation that they understood what is required for informed consent and agreed to participate. Verbal consent was preferred since many beneciaries are not literate and are not comfortable signing a piece of paper that they do not understand. A copy of the questionnaire and consent form are available on request.
C.
Descriptives Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sampled Girinka cow beneciary households, where standard errors are clustered at the cell level and survey weights are used. The rst panel gives information on the head of household that received a Girinka cow. They have at most primary (58%) or no (34%) education, derive their main income sources from farming (91%), and have household sizes of around 5.4.
Prior to the Girinka cow transfer, beneciary households are almost assetless: they own on average three assets, which would typically be a hand-hoe (owned by 94% of the households), a radio (owned by 61%) and a mattress (49%). These characteristics of beneciary households: having low levels of human capital, being reliant on agriculture for income and owning very few assets, very much make them resemble the world's poor [Banerjee and Duo 2007] access to sector vets, and so the returns to any training provided initially with the cow transfer might be especially high in this setting. At the same time, the data highlights how geographically remote these households are, and consequently, they have limited access to markets. As such, the potential income gains from raising cow productivity -that might arise because of training provision -might also be limited in this context, and this can attenuate the returns to training.
The remaining rows of Table 1 describe features of the livestock transfers: the average beneciary received the Girinka cow in 2009; 23% of these cows are passons, meaning that they were not received from an NGO or the government but from someone within the community who had received a Girinka cow previously. Some
NGOs track activities within the villages they operate in over time, and so such pass-ons might also be received with the same kinds of complementary training being provided by the NGO as for the original Girinka cow. Most households received a cow of the Ankole breed, a breed native to Africa. About 21% of households received either an exotic purebred, or a cow that is suciently highly crossbred to display most of the genetic markers of the exotic breed: these cows are typically associated with higher milk production and hence higher returns. Nevertheless, they are at the same time perceived to be of higher risk as they are less apt to cope with unpredictable uctuations in the environment or disease outbreaks and require more careful feeding to realize their potential.
The nal panel of Table 1 shows the percentage of households that report in the household survey to have received some training with the cow transfer: 30% of all Girinka beneciaries received some type of training together with the cow, provided by the distributing organization. Training provided could either be a session concentrating on a certain topic, or combine a number of topics in one training. If a beneciary received training with the cow, then he or she reports to have been trained on average on two topics. This is in line with information provided by sector vets who report that private NGO providers typically spread their training over two sessions.
The most common topic beneciaries report to have been trained on when receiving the cow is how to build a shed (reported by 80% of trained beneciaries).
The second most common training topic is feed (53%). Approximately a third of trained beneciaries report to have received training on disease together with their cow. The same percentage of households received training on manure together with the cow. The nal row reports the percentage of households that also received a pack of medicines or other inputs were provided with the cow: these take the form of feed, sheds, material for building shed's or micro loans. Around 14% of households report receiving such assistance at the time of the Girinka cow transfer.
Column 2 in Table 1 shows the average dierence on each characteristic between beneciary households with and without training, conditional on sector xed eects.
The corresponding p-values are reported below this dierence. We see that there are a number of signicant dierences between households that did and did not receive any training with their Girinka cow. However the direction of the likely biases these dierences might induce are not all in the same direction. A priori, on some factors, those with training are likely to be worse o all else equal: they are from larger households, and reside in locations more remote from sector vets. On other factors they might be better o: they are less likely to be female headed and less likely to have received a traditional Ankole cow. On a range of other observables, such as household head's age, education levels, pre-transfer asset holdings, frequency of visits to the sector from government veterinarians, there are no signicant dierences between households with and without training. Taken together, this evidence highlights that it will be important to assess the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional classes of controls.
Finally, we note that households that received training with their cow are also signicantly more likely to have received a package of other inputs in the form of medicine, feed, a shed, or a loan. In our empirical analysis we will therefore be able to assess whether and how the longer term returns to the provision of training, that aim to ease skills constraints among beneciaries, dier from the returns to these inputs, that essentially ease capital/input constraints at the time of the asset transfer.
D. Empirical Method
To evaluate the additional impact of training with the receipt of a Girinka cow transfer, we estimate the following specication,
where, y ics is the outcome of interest of household i in cell (village) c and sector s; T i equals one if household i received training from the distributing NGO or government organization; C i are variables at the Girinka cow level: type of breed received, year the cow was received, indicator whether anything other than training was received with the cow (medicines, feed, etc.), and an indicator whether it was a pass-on;
Xhead i includes information on the household head: age, gender, education level, main economic activity; Xhh i features household characteristics: number of household members, information on household composition, type of dwelling, type of roof and oor; V et c includes cell level information provided by the sector vet: the number of minutes it takes him/her (the vet) to reach the cell, an indicator whether (s)he travels to the cell on foot, an interaction of these two variables, and the number of days passed since (s)he visited the cell; and F E s are a set of dummies for each sector s to account for any unobserved heterogeneity across sectors that might determine some outcomes, such as distance to local agricultural and livestock markets. After dropping observations with any missing values from these sets of controls, our working sample corresponds to 786 beneciary households.
Given that equal probability sampling could not be applied at every stage of the sampling process, we weight the data to be representative of the population.
9 To account for common shocks/unobservables across households in the same location, we cluster standard errors at the cell level.
In this specication, β is our coecient of interest: it measures the strength and direction of the relationship between the outcome of interest and the training indicator. If the provision of this training is exogenous to unobservable farmer characteristics, ics ,β would consistently identify the causal additional impact of training on household outcomes among those that receive a Girinka cow. Of course, there are concerns that the provision of training is endogenously determined. For example, if beneciaries themselves select to receive training or not, then we expect those that stand the most to gain from training to receive it. This impliesβ is biased upwards relative to the impact of training were it to be provided to the entire population.
To the extent that in other settings farmers would always self-select into training, our estimates can also be informative of what would occur if a similar program were to be rolled our elsewhere. There are few practical circumstances in which farmers are randomly assigned to training, and so understanding the average returns to training in the population certainly appears less policy relevant. On the other hand, given it is essentially supply side constraints that drive training provision in our setting, 9 To estimate population parameters, the data are weighted to be representative. Provincial level weights (to account for unequal provincial strata in district sampling) were calculated as the inverse of probability of being selected (number of districts in province/number chosen in province). District level weights were calculated as the inverse of probability of selection within the district (number of sectors in district/number chosen in district) multiplied by the total recipient population in each district. Sector level weights were calculated as the inverse of probability of selection within the sector (number of cells in sector/2) multiplied by the total recipient population in each sector. The sector weight was normalized such that the total of sector weights within each district is equal across districts. Cell level clusters were selected with replacement by probability proportional to size thus the weight for each cell selected is the number of times this cell was selected (before the algorithm terminated) divided by the total number of cells (including cells selected multiple times) selected.
The design weights are calculated as the product of the provincial, district, sector and cell weights, normalized to the size of the population under study (for the expected sample). As response rates varied across the sampled districts, non-response weights were also calculated. The non-response adjustment was to increase the size of the weight on each cell by the inverse of the response rate.
This assumes that those missing in a particular cell are represented in an unbiased way by those who were achieved. Given that there were almost zero refusals (there was only one recorded refusal by a household that did have a cow), this is not problematic in terms of self-selection into the survey.
However, because those that moved recently from one cell to another may well dier from those that did not move (given Rwanda's tightly organized communities), there may be some bias where people could not be reached for this reason.
our ndings are informative of the broader question of whether constraints on human capital or skills relating to animal husbandry appear to be binding in this environment.
Our survey of sector vets and interviews with leading NGO distributors provides some insights into the validity of these concerns. In multiple interviews, including with the two largest NGO donors, Heifer International and Send a Cow, as well as with sector vets, it was repeatedly conrmed that the training provided by private NGO actors, or government agents is typically bundled with the cow. These NGOs often consider the training an integral part of the process. Frequently beneciaries are trained in a group, where the whole group receives cows over a period of time and they are encouraged to form a cooperative to be trained and learn together.
Furthermore, none of the institutions interviewed identied attendance at training as a problem, which is unsurprising given that these institutions often follow up directly with their beneciaries for monitoring and evaluation purposes. This implies that no selection into training takes place on the side of the receiver. This information was conrmed by sector vets who all (but one) reported that organizations train all of their beneciaries and it is never the case that farmers approach the organizations for training.
This all suggests that beneciaries are not self-selecting to receive training. However, it raises the question whether organizations that provide training with the cow select their beneciaries based on certain parameters, rendering them dierent to the average beneciaries in terms of ex ante observables. This however seems unlikely.
The reason for this is the important role that the local community plays in the beneciary selection process: at the time this is done it is typically not known whether training will be provided with the cow, or the exact form that training would take if provided. Prior to the selection criteria being formalized in 2009, there may have been less stringent application of the criteria, but even so, all selection still had to pass through community channels. The discussion of beneciaries characteristics above from 
IV. Results
In order for households to successfully engage in livestock rearing, they need to: (i) maintain an animal's health; (ii) enable it to become pregnant and then produce ospring and lactate; (iii) to engage in best practices to maximize milk production;
(iv) milk the cow, and store the milk, in a sanitary manner; (v) bring excess produce (that is not for own consumption) to market. Dierent types of training can focus on dierent aspects of these pathways: training on diseases will protect the animal's health, and improved health will lead to a higher likelihood of reproduction, which contributes to sustaining and increasing the herd size and at the same time allows for milk production. Improved feeding practices would further be expected to lead to better quality and higher quantity of milk produced. Our training indicator, presented in Table 1 , encompasses training on all these aspects. We would therefore expect that if the returns to training are positive, then its provision should impact the sequence of outcomes we now study from milk production, to earnings, through to asset accumulation.
A. Milk Production
The rst outcome we consider is whether the original simultaneous provision of training with the cow transfer correlates to whether a household currently produces milk in 2012. Milk production is a precondition to reach the program's long-term goal of reducing poverty by improving nutrition and income. Table 2 provides probit estimates of (1) where the outcome variable, y ics , is a dummy variable equal to one if the household produces milk on survey date, and zero otherwise. Milk production is recorded from all animals the household owns. The data does not allow us to distinguish whether the produced milk is specically from the original Girinka cow.
However we note that 82% of beneciaries report retaining the Girinka cow: given the median household received their Girinka cow in 2009, there is some likelihood the other Girinka cows have either died or been sold. On average, each household owns 1.16 cows, with 74% of households owning one female cow, and 6% owning no cow.
Hence in the majority of cases it appears as if households own exactly one cow and this is indeed the originally transferred Girinka cow.
In Columns 1 to 6 of Table 2 we sequentially add in more classes of control variable across columns, and report marginal eects from the probit model estimation of
(1). The stability of the estimate of interestβ across these specications is therefore informative of whether this estimate is likely to suer from omitted variable bias. As can be seen across Columns 1 to 6, the sign, magnitude and signicance of the coecient on our training indicator is extremely robust across the dierent specications.
Column 1 simply regresses the dummy for milk production on the training indicator dummy, unconditional on all other covariates. Girinka cow beneciary households that received some training simultaneous to the asset transfer of the cow are 15pp more likely to be producing milk on the survey date. Columns 2 to 6 show this nding to be robust to the inclusion of sector dummies, characteristics of the cow received, household head characteristics, household controls, and controls related to the sector vet characteristics. In Column 6 once all these controls are added, the marginal impact of training remains signicant at the 1% level and the magnitude, 14pp, is not signicantly dierent from the marginal impact estimated in the unconditional specication in Column 1 of 15pp.
To benchmark this magnitude we note that 25% of households that did not receive training produce currently milk. Hence the increase of 14pp in Column 6 corresponds to a 56% increase in the likelihood of producing milk for those households that received training. In short, around 39% of households with training produce milk. To get a sense of what the maximum attainable levels of milk production might be, we note that in the most favorable circumstances, a high potential cow should calve once every 12 months and the subsequent length of milk production thereafter is 210 days for Ankole cows, 265 for crossbred and 300 for purebred cows [Argent et al. 2012 ].
This implies that under ideal circumstances found on modern intensive dairy farms,
given the genetic structure of this herd, in any given survey cross section, 67% of cows should be producing milk. The beneciaries of Girinka cows remain a long way from this ideal, but the provision of training goes a considerable way to narrow these production gaps.
Moreover, the other coecients in Table 2 show that training is a far more robust predictor of milk production than other measures of human capital or wealth: the education level of the household head has no impact on the likelihood of producing milk, and the various proxies of household wealth: assets owned prior to the Girinka transfer, whether the household's dwelling is a single structure, whether the roof is made of tiles, and whether the oor is made of earth/dung, do not correlate to whether the household produces milk.
B. Uses of Produced Milk
The next set of results presented in Table 3 focus on the quantity of milk produced, and the uses of this milk: whether it is consumed or given away, or sold. For com-pleteness, Column 1a replicates our preferred specication from Column 6 of Table 2 on whether the household produces milk. Column 1b estimates the amount of milk currently produced (in liters) using a Tobit specication (setting households that do not produce milk to zero). This shows, in line with the increased likelihood of producing milk, that households that receive training also signicantly increase the quantity of milk produced. On average, a household that received training produces 1.5 liters of milk more per day than Girinka beneciaries that received no training with their cow transfer. This compares to an average daily production of slightly less than one liter per day for households that did not receive training. All else equal, the provision of training therefore increases the quantity of milk produced by 162% on average.
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Such an increase in milk production can of course be a result of two dierent channels: an increase in the herd size and/or an increase in the productivity of a given animal holding constant herd size. We later present evidence on herd size when we consider the impact of training on asset accumulation more broadly. On productivity per animal, the result in Column 1c of Table 3 shows the previously documented increase in milk production is to a large extent driven by an increase in the productivity of cows, holding constant herd size. On average, each female cow owned by a household that received training produces 1.15 liters more than for a household that received no training. As with the likelihood to produce milk, other measures of the human capital of the household head and proxies for household wealth are not much correlated with the quantity of milk produced.
The remaining Columns of Table 3 We see that the provision of training signicantly increases the likelihood that 10 These levels of milk production from cows are lower than those reported in Anagol et al. [2012] based on survey data for cows in rural India in 2007: they report daily milk production of between two and three liters per cow for most stages of the lactation cycle. Pimkina et al. [2013] households consume their own milk, as well as reporting that they sell some of their produced milk to friends and neighbors. The marginal impact on the likelihood of milk being used for own consumption is nearly three times that on sales of milk to others in the village. This is as expected given the low levels of milk consumption among beneciary households. However, on the intensive margin we do not nd any impact of training on the quantities of milk consumed (Column 2b). In contrast there is a signicant increase in the amount of milk sold to friends and neighbors. Households that received training are 5.4pp more likely to sell milk to their peers and they sell on average 1.24 liters more to them.
11 Taken together these ndings suggest that there is a relative shift towards selling or giving away milk as production increases. Hence the proportion of own-produced milk that is consumed, falls as production increases, even though total consumption increases.
For the other types of milk use: giving away milk or selling it through local markets, there are no impacts on either the extensive margin of the frequency with which such milk-transfers take place, nor on the intensive margin of the quantity of milk that goes through such channels. On why beneciaries with training appear to sell more to peers than to others, it might be that given the remoteness of these households, access to markets remains poor and the xed cost of traveling to them remain too high, especially given milk is a perishable good. We also note that our data suggests neighbors pay the highest price for the milk, although it remains unclear why peers pay more. It might be that watering down milk -and hence reducing its quality -is more easily monitored by neighbors, which would imply that the price premium is justied by higher quality (i.e. higher fat percentage) milk.
C. Earnings
Given that the evidence suggests households sell more milk as a result of having received training with their Girinka cow transfer, the next natural outcome to consider in sequence is household earnings from milk sales. Table 4 presents these results where the dependent variables relate to current daily milk production and its value (Columns 1a-1b), earnings from current daily milk production (Columns 2a-2b), and earnings from milk production in the last month (Columns 3a-3b). To calculate the value of daily production produced by household i, V milk i , we need to price milk that is self-consumed. To do so, we multiply the number of liters currently produced per day times the relevant price of milk, so that,
where Q ms i is the quantity of milk sold (in liters) by household i, Q mc i is the quantity of milk consumed by household i, p i is the price received by household i for the liters of milk they actually sell, andp s−i is the median price in a cell received by other households that sell milk. In our sample, the median price of a liter of raw milk varies around RWF100 to RWF200.
Unsurprisingly given the earlier ndings on milk production and milk usage, we nd that training signicantly increases the value of the home produced milk by on average RWF 514 per day (Column 1b). At the current exchange rate, this translates into an increase of daily household income by US.82¢, equivalent to almost 66% of a non-trained household's daily income. In line with the earlier results on animal productivity, we also conrm that most of the earnings increase occurs through increased earnings per cow per day from milk production: these rise by RWF 422 (not shown).
Column 2a shows that beneciaries with training are 9pp more likely to currently have earnings from actual milk sales (as is consistent with the evidence from Table   3 on the uses of non-consumed milk); Column 2b shows the corresponding earnings increase is on average RWF 340. This result is not only highly signicant statistically, but also economically signicant: it is a sixfold increase in earnings as compared to the average earnings of households that did not receive training. The increase is lower when we consider the reported earnings in the last month (Columns 3a-3b), but trained households are still estimated to have earned three times as much within the last month than those households that were not trained. Taken together, these ndings on earnings show that even if market linkages for beneciary households remain weak, the monetary returns to training provision remains high through sales to other households within the same village.
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It is possible that households that received training substitute labor or capital away from other activities towards dairying. If this was the case, we would nd the eects on total household earnings to be smaller than the eect on dairy activities.
Our evidence suggests however that this is not the case. Once the top 2% of total income observations are trimmed, households that received training have signicantly more sources of income (Column 4a) and the impact on total household earnings in the month preceding the survey is quantitatively almost identical to the one on earnings from milk production over the same period (Column 4b).
To gauge the rate of return to the training provided, we compare this daily monetary return of RWF 514, to the per beneciary cost of training provision. We obtained information on training costs from one of the most important NGO partners for the delivery of the Girinka program, Send a Cow. Their animal husbandry related training, that takes place over seven days and in groups of farmers, was estimated to cost around RWF 7800 per beneciary. Hence a comparison of costs and benets suggests the provision of training would break even if the daily earnings gains documented above of RWF 514 were maintained for only 15 days of the year. As a point of comparison, we note that in ideal circumstances, after calving, cows typically produce milk for approximately 10 months. In our setting, even after taking into account all the dierences from ideal circumstances for animal husbandry, the provision of training is likely to deliver higher milk yields for a number of months, yielding an eective rate of return far higher than 100% for those farmers for whom the training does lead to a higher likelihood of milk production. There are unlikely to be many other types of investment available to beneciary that yield such returns in the same time frame.
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This calculation is valid for those households that produce more milk as a result of the training. The earlier results showed that the provision of training leads to around 14% more households producing milk in the rst place. Factoring this into the calculation, the ex ante expected increase in the value of milk production is .14 x 514 = RWF 72, and so the entire program would break even if farmers maintained the higher milk yields documented above for 108 days. Again this is likely given the usual 10 month period over which cows normally supply milk.
level of earnings. Such mechanisms are explored in more detail in Bandiera et al. [2013] .
13 It would be reasonable to suppose that there are some additional xed costs associated with training provision, or costs associated with rst registering farmers for such training. However, the same basic point remains: the returns to training with the Girinka cow yields huge returns.
D. Herd Size and Asset Accumulation
As discussed above, the observed increase in household's milk production can be driven by higher productivity of individual cows, or by an increase in the number of cows producing milk. We earlier documented the impact of training on the productivity per cow, and now turn to analyze the impact of training on overall herd size.
Training can impact dierent channels leading to stable, or increased, herd sizes. For example knowledge on when and how to inseminate an animal can increase the success rate of breeding and calving, which in turn leads not only to an increase in herd size without having to purchase animals, but also to milk production. Training on diseases on the other hand prevents animals from dying and hence prevents a decrease in herd size, all else equal.
We look at the impact of training on the herd size in Column 1 of Table 5 .
While the coecient is positive, it is not signicantly dierent from zero. More interestingly though, from the remaining columns we learn that while the herd size remains stable, households that were trained have signicantly more calves born to their farm (Column 2), and they sell signicantly higher numbers of cattle (Column 4). It hence becomes clear that training not only increases productivity of animals but also helps the households to breed more animals. Calving of course increases milk production directly, but also allows the household to sell animals.
Column 6 begins to examine how households uses these various sources of additional income from increased milk sales and sales of young calves: specically we can check whether households that received more training with their original Girinka cow are able to accumulate more assets today (recall that as shown in Table 1 , households with and without training report similar assets prior to the Girinka transfer).
No information was collected on savings, although we note that an established earlier literature has suggested that livestock is often the most important savings device or store of value for the rural poor, as alternative forms of informal or formal savings devices rare [Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993] . Households were asked about what types and how many tools and assets they own, for thirteen dierent items.
The households were also asked to report how many of these assets were purchased after receiving the Girinka cow. In Column 6 of Table 5 we present results for the total number of asset types owned by the household. In Appendix Table A1 we present more detailed information by each asset type on whether it is owned and the number owned for a subset of asset types (cellphone, bicycle, stove, and mattress).
We nd that households that received training own signicantly more types of assets (on average 0.27) and also own a signicantly larger number of assets (0.67 more). Of the thirteen items the households were asked about, they own on average 3.2 at the time the Girinka cow was provided to them. A coecient of 0.27 on the training indicator hence implies an eight percent increase in types of assets owned if compared to non-trained households. The number of assets owned increased by about 14%. Both results are highly signicant. In Table A1 we nd that this result is predominantly driven by an increase in stove ownership (Columns 4a and 4b). The mean of stove ownership for non-trained households is 27%. Households with training are 13pp more likely to own a stove. We also nd that training impacts the likelihood of owning a bicycle positively (Column 3a) and households that are trained seem to invest in a greater number of mattresses (Column 5b). and cow transfers are shaped over time. In many cases we expect training to lead to self-perpetuating gains to households in terms of milk production and calves sold over time. We focus on the main outcomes investigated in Section 4: whether the household produces milk, the amount of milk produced, earnings from daily milk production, and the number of cows sold.
E. Impacts by Year of Transfer
On whether the household farm currently produces milk or not, we earlier documented the fact that the provision of training is associated with a signicantly higher likelihood of currently producing milk. To understand how this impact diers by year of the transfer, we extend our baseline specication in (1) 14 Reassuringly, we see the predicted probability of producing milk dropping sharply for all households who received the cow in 2011 (trained and untrained). Given that milk production is conditional on the cow giving birth, which would usually not happen so quickly after the cow is received, this is not an unexpected nding. Figure 2 shows a very similar pattern is found when considering the impact of training received with the cow on the quantity of milk currently produced. Again, dierences between trained and untrained households diers for training received in 2008 and in 2010 are signicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels. Figure 3 shows the heterogeneous impacts of training by year of Girinka cow transfer for current earnings from selling milk. We again nd that the longer ago the training was received, the higher the impacts are on earnings from selling milk.
However, while marginal impacts for trained beneciaries are always above those of untrained ones, the dierence is only signicant when the cow was received one or two years previous to the survey (in 2010 the dierence is signicant at the 1% signicance level, in 2009 at the 10% level).
Finally, we consider the number of cows sold since the Girinka cow was received.
In line with intuition, we nd the impacts of training are notably higher the longer ago the cow and training were received: cows received more recently simply have not had the time to produce ospring that could have been sold. More importantly, this nding is considerably sharper for trained households, the left had side of Figure 4 shows, with the dierences among cows received in 2006 and 2007 being signicantly dierent from zero.
These results are informative for the future evaluation of training bundled with livestock asset transfer programs: the returns to training vary over time and can be long lasting. Here we have documented positive returns to training up to six years after the initial asset transfer. For some of the most important means through with asset transfer programs increase incomes -such as sales of calves -such outcomes necessarily take time to be realized and so will not be picked up in very short run evaluations.
14 Note that to test for the statistical signicance of the interaction eect between trained and untrained beneciaries, we estimated cross-partial derivatives of the interaction eects. This is necessary when dealing with interaction terms in nonlinear models [Norton et al. 2004] , that is a probit specication in this case and tobit specications in the remaining outcomes we discuss.
F.
Training Types
The analysis has so far exploited the fact that dierent distributors of cows oered varying levels of training, support and extension services to recipients of cows. Some distributors provided cows with no complementary training, and others hired their own veterinarians/trainers to extend services to their new beneciaries. We now focus on two other elements of the Girinka and compare these features to the provision of training. First we note that some distributors also gave some form of support package along with the cow, including for example medicines, or the materials for building a shed to house the animal. Hence our next set of results show the impact of receiving such packages, that take the form of easing capital constraints on the margin, rather than skills constraints, controlling for the receipt of training. This helps address the concern that our previous results are merely picking up the receipt of this package rather than anything to do with the returns to training.
Second, we note that one of the justications for NGO distributors not providing training was that some perceived government veterinarians to be easily accessible to farmers in case of need. Our survey instrument collected information on whether individuals had received any training from sector vets by survey date. Hence our next set of results now additionally control for such training having been received.
When sector vets oer training, they often do so to groups of individuals in a village.
From our survey of sector vets, we found that the majority of sector vets reports that either everybody in a village (reported by 55% of vets) or every farmer in a village (reported by 35% of vets) is invited to attend a training. Only 7% of vets stated that they select participants based on need and only 11% said they decide to help a household or give them advice when they are visiting them for other reasons.
As expected, there is strong evidence for households themselves to demand the type of group training session from vets described above. All but one of the 30 sector vets stated that farmers approached them requesting training and the type of training provided by the sector vets is very closely in line with the type of training demanded by the farmers. This raises the concern that the indicator for having received training from the sector vet is endogenous and likely biased upwards as better or more needy farmers may have demanded such services in the rst place.
The results are in Table 6 . As in the previous section we focus again on on the main outcomes investigated in Section 4, now also including the number of assets owned. We note that across most outcomes, the indicator for training received with the cow remains positive, signicant and of similar magnitude than in the earlier results. Two additional striking and robust ndings emerge.
First, the provision of training from sector vets has little signicant impact on these outcomes of interest. Even if such training is sought out endogenously, it appears to be not much correlated with later milk production, earnings and asset accumulation.
This might tentatively suggest that the returns to training are especially high when provided at the same time as livestock asset transfers, but that training provided subsequently has far lower returns. This in turn might be because such training is only sought, and only provided with some delay, when outcomes are deteriorating with regards to livestock production.
An alternative explanation for the low returns to training received from sector vets is that the quality of training that sector vets are able to provide is just much lower than that provided with Girinka cows. Indeed, 72% of sector vets interviewed indicated that it was in their job description to provide advice rather than training,
suggesting that the nature of sector vet training may have been less formal. Sector vets also identied their training on a particular topic to be composed on average of fewer sessions (1 as compared to 2), and of shorter length (3.1 hours as opposed to 4.9 hours) relative to NGO oered training.
Second, the results in Table 6 also show the provision of packages of medicines and other inputs at the same time as asset transfers has little signicant impact on the outcomes of interest, indeed a number of the coecients have negative point
estimates. This suggests that easing capital constraints slightly at the same time as livestock asset transfers is far less eective than such transfers being bundled with the provision of training.
Both these results are informative for the design of future livestock asset transfer programs: training should be provided, there should not necessarily be a reliance on existing public sector vets as a source of training to farmers, and the provision of other inputs such as medicines, appears less eective in this setting than the provision of training per se.
V. Conclusions
Given Rwanda's stage of economic development, the Girinka One Cow policy is an ambitious and extensive asset transfer program, with over 130,000 livestock distributed to the rural poor in since 2006. The program provides researchers a rst opportunity to study the impacts of combining training with livestock asset transfers, relative to only providing livestock assets. We are able to do so because we note that the Girinka program was jointly implemented by government agencies and NGOs. The role of NGOs lay predominantly in the the distribution of cows. Given NGOs varied in their capacity to provide training alongside cows, we observe some beneciary households only receiving cow transfers and others receiving cows with complementary training.
As farmers themselves do not self-select to receive training, but rather the provision of training is driven by supply/capacity constraints faced by NGOs, the assignment of training is plausibly exogenous to other factors that drive outcomes related to milk production, livestock productivity, household earnings and assets, as measured up to six years after the initial livestock asset transfer.
Taken together, our results show that even in a setting where linkages between farmers and markets remain weak -that might attenuate the returns to training all else equal, the provision of training with asset transfers still has permanent and economically signicant impacts on household's milk production, livestock productivity, earnings, and asset accumulation. This training is found to be far more eective for these outcomes of interest than the availability of subsequent training from local government vets, or the provisions of small amounts of capital inputs provided with livestock asset transfers. The rate of return to the provision of training is high and likely larger than for other investments available to beneciary households: even a conservative estimate suggests training costs would be recovered and the program break even if the training allows households to obtain higher milk yields for three additional months of the year: as a point of comparison we note that in ideal circumstances, cows usually produce milk for 10 months after calving. Moving forward, the ndings suggest the crucial complementarity between asset transfers and training provision, the impacts of which persist over time, and for many outcomes, the impacts are self-perpetuating and increase in magnitude over time.
Clearly our research design does not generate estimates as sharply dened as causal as would be obtained from the current gold standard of randomized control trials. On the other hand, our estimates are nationally representative of the impacts of training in the Girinka program. However, no such RCT has yet been conducted to separately identify the impact of training with livestock asset transfers, either in the context of an`ultra-poor' program, or a livestock transfer program more broadly.
We thus view our ndings as providing novel, suggestive evidence on the way forward for research into the optimal design of such ultra-poor style livestock asset transfer programs, that are at the frontier of anti-poverty policies around the world.
Our ndings provide a timely input into the design of ultra-poor programs, as 
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We also document the impacts of the complementarity of asset transfers and training over the longer term, up to six years after the receipt of the Girinka cow for some households, eectively extending the time period that current evaluations of ultrapoor programs have been able to cover. We also provide more detailed evidence on 15 Recent evaluations of business training programs for aspiring entrepreneurs with and without capital grants [de Mel et al. 2012] provide evidence of such complementarity. This is also consistent with the fact that some evaluations of micronance suggest it does not help create new businesses [Banerjee et al. 2010 , Crepon et al. 2011 , Karlan and Zinman 2011 , Kaboski and Townsend 2011 and with the disappointing performance of short-term training for existing microentrepreneurs, which have generally been found ineective at increasing prots and business growth [Field et al. 2010 , Drexler et al. 2010 , Karlan and Valdivia 2011 , Fairlie et al. 2012 , Bruhn et al. 2012 , McKenzie and Woodru 2012 .
the mechanisms through which such programs likely generate earnings gains to households, such as the propensity to produce milk, milk yield per animal, and herd sizes.
As such our ndings suggest that future work -informed certainly by randomized control trials -should investigate the optimal design of training to bundle with asset transfers. This will become increasingly important as such programs are rolled out to dierent populations that vary in their links to markets, pre-existing levels of knowledge of livestock rearing, and availability of alternative sources of training such as government and private sector vets.
VI. 
Cow is a Pass-on
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The Table shows summary statistics for selected characteristics for all households in our sample. The panel relate to characteristics of the household head, household composition, asset holdings prior to Girinka cows being distributed, information obtained from sector vets, information related to the Girinka cow and on training received. Column 1 shows the mean of each characteristic in the main working sample based on 786 household observations. Column 2 shows the difference between those that did and did not receive training with the Girinka cows, with the p-value below in square brackets. Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The dependent variable across columns changes. Specifications related to whether any milk is produced, consumed, given away, sold to friends/neighbors or sold to local markets (Columns 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a) are estimated by probit models, where marginal impacts are reported. Specifications related to the quantities of milk produced, consumed, given away, sold to friends/neighbors or sold to local markets (Columns 1b, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b) are estimated by tobit models. The smaller sample size in some columns is then is due to some households consuming all the milk they produce. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell).
Information on
Number of Assets Owned Before Girinka Cow Received
Household 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The dependent variable across columns changes. Specifications related to whether any milk is produced, whether any earnings are generated from daily milk production, and whether any earnings are generated from milk production in the last month (Columns 1a, 2a, 3a) are estimated by probit models, where marginal impacts are reported. Specifications related to the value of total daily milk production, earnings from daily milk production and earnings from milk production in the last month (Columns 1b, 2b, 3b) are estimated by tobit models. The smaller sample sizes in some columns is due to some households not selling any of their milk. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The dependent variable across columns changes. All specifications are estimated using OLS regression models. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The dependent variable across columns changes. The specification related to whether any milk is produced (Column 1a) is estimated by a probit model, where marginal impacts are reported. Specifications related to the amount or value of total daily milk production (Columns 2 and 3) are estimated by tobit models. The specifications related to the number of cows sold or assets owned (Columns 4 and 5) are estimated using OLS regression models. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: an dummy variable for whether any training is received from a sector vet after the Girinka cow transfer, a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The dependent variable across columns changes. Specifications related to the number of assets of a given type is owned are estimated using a tobit model (Columns 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b) . Specifications related to whether an asset is owned are estimated by probit models, where marginal effects are reported (Columns 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a) . Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: an dummy variable for whether any training is received from a sector vet after the Girinka cow transfer, a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). Notes: +++ denotes significance at 1%, ++ at 5%, and + at 10% level. Each figure considers a different outcome and plots the predicted probabilities of series of interactions between the year of transfer and the training indicator. Results in figure one are obtained through a linear specification, and Figures 2 to 4 using tobit specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All estimations control for the following covariates in addition to the interaction terms: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and floor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). Predictive Margins of interactions (year cow received X training)
